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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 09-4727 
_____________ 
 
STACY COLEMAN, individually and as class representative 
On behalf of others similarly situated formally known as STACY KOVILARITCH 
     
 
v. 
 
CHASE HOME FINANCE, LLC, Successor by merger to  
CHASE MANHATTAN MORTGAGE CORP.; 
 JOHN DOE 1-100; JOHN DOE SERVICERS 1-100 
 
Stacy Coleman, 
   Appellant 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the District of New Jersey 
(Civ. No. 08-cv-02215) 
District Judge:  Honorable Noel L. Hillman 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a), 
May 24, 2011 
 
BEFORE:  FUENTES, FISHER, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: July 12, 2011) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
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 Appellant Stacy Coleman filed a class action suit against Appellee Chase Home 
Finance, LLC (“Chase”), alleging thirteen separate causes of action, all stemming from 
allegedly excessive fees she was charged to reinstate her mortgage after a foreclosure 
judgment in favor of Chase.  Initially, the District Court dismissed the complaint for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), the Class Action Fairness Act 
(“CAFA”).  After Coleman amended the complaint to correct jurisdictional deficiencies, 
Chase moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), and the District Court granted the motion, 
dismissing the amended complaint on the basis of New Jersey‟s entire controversy 
doctrine.  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm. 
I. 
   Because we write for the parties, we discuss the facts only to the extent necessary 
for the resolution of the issues raised on appeal.  On October 28, 1997, Coleman secured 
a mortgage on her home from Eastern American Mortgage Company, and the mortgage 
note was then assigned to Chase.  Coleman subsequently defaulted on her loan, and 
Chase filed a foreclosure action in the Chancery Division of the New Jersey Superior 
Court.  The court entered judgment in favor of Chase in the amount of $90,401, and also 
awarded $1,600 in attorney‟s and other fees.  Coleman, however, did not pay the 
judgment, and a foreclosure sale was stalled for approximately three and a half years 
while Coleman filed three bankruptcy proceedings.  On November 4, 2005, after 
dismissal of the third bankruptcy proceeding, Chase sent Coleman a quote for reinstating 
the mortgage in return for a payment of $18,658.  Of that total, the letter stated that $900 
was to be collected for foreclosure fees and $5,791 was to be collected for foreclosure 
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costs.  On January 17, 2006, Coleman paid in full the amount quoted by Chase to 
reinstate her mortgage.  Three days later, the Chancery Court entered a judgment of 
dismissal without prejudice in the foreclosure action. 
 Two years after paying the reinstatement balance, Coleman commenced a class 
action suit against Chase alleging multiple claims, all related to alleged overcharges of 
attorney‟s costs and fees in the reinstatement quote.1  Coleman asserted that the $6,691 
worth of foreclosure costs and fees was not only in excess of the amount ordered by the 
Chancery Court, but that it was also in excess of those permitted by Fair Housing Act 
(“FHA”) regulations and New Jersey statute and court rules.  After the initial complaint 
was amended due to a jurisdictional defect regarding the “home state” exception to the 
CAFA, Chase renewed its motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and also moved to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim under Rule 12(b)(6).  Although the District Court denied the 12(b)(1) motion, it 
granted Chase‟s 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss based on New Jersey‟s entire controversy 
doctrine. 
 Coleman filed a timely appeal.  We have jurisdiction over the District Court‟s final 
order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
II. 
                                              
1
 Those claims include: (1) breach of contract; (2) intentional misrepresentation; (3) 
negligence; (4) breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing; (5) unjust enrichment; (6) 
unfair and deceptive assessment and collection of fees; (7) violation of the Fair 
Foreclosure Act (“FFA”); (8) excessive fees in violation of New Jersey Court Rule R 
4:42-9(a)(4); (9) excessive taxed costs in violation of various state statutes; (10) violation 
of New Jersey‟s Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”); (11) forfeiture of interest; and (12) 
violation of the Truth-In Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act. 
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 Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a court may dismiss a complaint “for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  “Under Rule 
(12)(b)(6), a motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded 
allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, a court finds that plaintiff‟s claims lacks facial plausibility.”  Warren Gen. 
Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., --- F.3d ----, 2011 WL 2321393 at *5 (3d Cir. June 14, 2011) (citing 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 
(2007)).  We conduct plenary review of the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim.  Id.  Because we find that New Jersey‟s entire controversy doctrine would 
bar recovery in this case, we agree with the District Court that Coleman has failed to state 
a claim upon which relief may be granted. 
 The entire controversy doctrine compels the parties, when possible, to bring all 
claims relevant to the underlying controversy in one legal action.  When the court finds 
that a claim not joined under the original action falls within the scope of the doctrine, that 
claim is barred.  N.J. Ct. R. 4:30A.  The doctrine “seeks to further the judicial goals of 
fairness and efficiency by requiring, whenever possible, „that the adjudication of a legal 
controversy should occur in one litigation in only one court.‟” Circle Chevrolet Co. v. 
Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, 662 A.2d 509, 513 (N.J. 1995) (quoting Cogdell v. 
Hospital Ctr., 560 A.2d 1169, 1172 (N.J. 1989)).  The doctrine is also applied to New 
Jersey claims in federal court.  Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ., 941 F.2d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 
1991).  However, application of the entire controversy doctrine is “equitable in nature” 
and based substantially on “judicial fairness,” meaning that the Court must balance 
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considerations of judicial efficiency as well as fairness to the litigants. Cafferata v. 
Peyser, 597 A.2d 1101, 1103 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) 
 New Jersey courts have held that the primary consideration in determining if 
successive claims are part of the same controversy is whether the claims “arise from 
related facts or from the same transaction or series of transactions.”  DiTrolio v. Antiles, 
662 A.2d 494, 502 (N.J. 1995).  It is a “commonality of facts, rather than [a] 
commonality of issues, parties, or remedies that defines the scope of the controversy.”  
Id. at 504.  The limits of the entire controversy doctrine with regards to foreclosure 
actions are necessarily somewhat narrower, as N.J. Ct. R. 4:64-5 requires that only 
“germane” counterclaims may be joined in a foreclosure action.  See N.J. Ct. R. 4:30A.  
 Claims are considered to be germane to a foreclosure action if they arise out of the 
mortgage that is the basis of the foreclosure action.  Leisure Technology-Northeast, Inc. 
v. Klingbeil Holding Co., 349 A.2d 96, 98 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975).  Here, 
Coleman‟s claims arose directly out of a reinstatement quote that was provided to her as 
an alternative to a foreclosure sale, and the excessive fees allegedly charged by Chase 
would not have been charged but for the foreclosure action.  Accordingly, Coleman‟s 
causes of action arose out of and were germane to the original foreclosure action. 
 However, Coleman makes three arguments why her federal claims should not fall 
within the doctrine despite the fact that they are otherwise “germane” to the foreclosure 
action.  First, the doctrine is not a bar to successive claims where they have accrued after 
the pendency of the of the original action.  McNally v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 
698 A.2d 543, 548 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997).  Coleman argues that the foreclosure 
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action was no longer pending once judgment was issued on August 1, 2002, and thus her 
claims are not barred by the entire controversy doctrine.  We disagree.  A court retains 
jurisdiction in a foreclosure action even after a final judgment, until delivery of the 
sheriff‟s deed under New Jersey Court Rule 4:65-5.  Sovereign Bank, FSB v. Kuelzow, 
687 A.2d 1039, 1043 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997).  “The foreclosure action, although 
already the subject of a judgment, is not totally concluded until the defendants‟ equity of 
redemption is cut off by the delivery of the sheriff‟s deed.”  Id.  Here, the fact that the 
foreclosure sale had been stalled due to the bankruptcy proceedings and the judgment had 
not been paid meant that the foreclosure action continued to be pending until Coleman 
paid the reinstatement quote and the judge vacated the judgment and dismissed the claims 
on January 20, 2006.   Thus, the state court still had jurisdiction over the matter and 
Coleman could have brought her claims as a part of the original foreclosure action until 
January 20. 
  Second, Coleman argues that the entire controversy doctrine does not apply to 
“related claims which were unknown, or had not arisen or accrued during the pendency 
of the original action.”  Riemer v. St. Clare’s Riverside Med. Ctr., 691 A.2d 1384, 1388 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997).  New Jersey‟s discovery rule states that a cause of 
action has not accrued unless the plaintiff knows or should have known that “(1) she has 
suffered damage and (2) that the damages were caused by the fault of another.”  Maertin 
v. Armstrong World Indus. Inc., 241 F.Supp.2d 434, 458 n.18 (D.N.J. 2002).  Therefore, 
if Coleman was unaware of either of these facts at the time the foreclosure action became 
final on January 20, 2006, her successive causes of action would not yet have accrued 
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and the doctrine would be inapplicable.  Yet, when Coleman received the reinstatement 
quote from Chase on November 4, 2005, she should have been aware that the amount 
differed substantially from the fee determination in the original foreclosure action.  Her 
counsel, who had represented her since the original foreclosure action, and whom we 
presume reviewed the reinstatement quote, also should have been aware of these facts.  
Thus, her cause of action accrued on November 4 while the original foreclosure action 
was still pending, and she is barred by the entire controversy doctrine.    
 We also disagree with Coleman‟s argument that she did not have a “fair and 
reasonable opportunity to have fully litigated that claim in the original action.”  
Cafferata, 597 A.2d at 1104.  While it might not have been clear to Coleman that the fees 
charged by Chase in the reinstatement quote were allegedly in violation of state law, as 
explained above, it is undeniable that she was on notice, or should have been on notice, 
that the fees charged were substantially larger than those issued by the state court.  This is 
especially true given that the same counsel represented Coleman from the time of the 
original foreclosure action up through the time that she paid the reinstatement quote.
 
 
 Ultimately, the entire controversy doctrine requires equitable considerations and is 
determinable on a case-by-case basis.  Paramount Aviation Corp. v. Agusta, 178 F.3d 
132, 137 (3d Cir. 1999).  The “polestar for the application of the rule is judicial fairness.”  
Reno Auto Sales, Inc. v. Prospect Park Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 581 A.2d 109, 113 (N.J. Sup. 
Ct. App. Div. 1990) (citing Cogdell, 560 A.2d at 1179) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  We must balance the plaintiff‟s right to bring a separate action against the 
defendant‟s right to avoid excessive litigation.  Here, we are not persuaded that Coleman 
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was deprived of a fair opportunity to litigate her claims.  Accordingly, the District Court 
properly granted Chase‟s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).  
III. 
 We further conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by 
dismissing the complaint with prejudice.  Where amendment of a complaint could not 
possibly correct the defect that led to the original dismissal, the District Court does not 
abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend.  In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. 
Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997).  Because any amendment to the complaint 
would not overcome the entire controversy deficiency, the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion.  We have considered Coleman‟s remaining claims and find they are without 
merit and require no further discussion. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the ruling of the District Court. 
